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abSTracT1
According to environmental psychology, in the process of behaviour physical 
environment is man’s companion, equal partner, which, together with the internal 
psychological processes and in interaction (transaction) with these, partakes in the 
behavioural process. This standpoint makes it possible to raise quite a few questions,
psychological in nature, about humans acting in a built/physical and natural environ-
ment, starting from this psychologically unusual set-off. These questions can (or for the 
most part can) be answered with psychological tools – “only” the man-environment 
transaction must be taken seriously, both from theoretical and practical perspective.
enVironmenTal PercePTion and rePreSenTaTion
According to ecological psychological research results, the successful behaviour 
(or more widely: the survival) of individuals largely depends of the degree to which 
the organism is able to accurately perceive the surrounding environment. Practi-
cally, the processes of sensation and perception are the only direct connection of 
living organisms – humans among them – with the outside world (see e.g. Sekuler–
Blake 1994/2000). The perception of the environment is the basis of all environ-
mental behaviour: in order to comprehend, alter and efficiently utilise the physical 
environment, first of all a clear and accurate environmental perception is needed. 
One of the most important psychological roles of human environmental perception 
is, that in an active interconnection, transaction with the environment (see Dúll 
2002c), it oversees, organises most of the human activities constituting everyday 
life. Transaction means that environmental perception is the basis of knowledge 
about the world – mental representation –, the existence and operation of which 
is a basic condition of efficient functioning in the world. Based on the perception 
of the world around us, representations mapping the world in our heads and words 
expressing them are developed, which have direct reference to the actual, physical/
material world. Let us quote the thought experiment of Putnam about the mental 
representations of the physical world, of the people of the imaginary “Twin Earth”:
“We imagine that the year is 1750 (both on Earth and on Twin Earth) and Daltonian 
chemistry has not yet been invented. We also imagine that the people on Twin 
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Earth have brains identical with ours, a society virtually identical with ours, and so 
on. […] The only relevant difference between Earth and Twin Earth is that the liquid 
that plays the role of water on Twin Earth is not H2O, but a different compound, 
call it XYZ. On Twin Earth it does not rain H2O but it rains XYZ, people drink XYZ, 
the lakes and rivers are full of XYZ, and so on. […] Imagining this case to be actual, 
we should say that the term »water« does not have the same reference (even in 1750) 
in Earth English and Twin Earth English. […] The reference of the word »water« on 
Earth is the stuff we call water, the stuff we have discovered to be H2O. […] What 
they call »water« on Twin Earth, [or the stuff it is referred to as »water«] is the stuff 
that the people of Twin Earth discovered to be XYZ. […] The »mental representations« 
of the speakers on Earth and on Twin Earth do not differ in anything, […] the references 
are different because the compounds are different” (Putnam 1988/2000: 66–69.).
Following the above train of thought, it becomes quite clear that the material-physical 
world, even in such a broad sense, has got a direct role in shaping mental represen-
tations and the psychological meaning of the world.
THEORIES Of PERCEPTIOn: A SHORT OVERVIEw
Processes of perception are tried to be explained by two groups of theories
2
 in an 
animated debate with each other: the theory of constructive perception (e.g. Neisser 
1967) and the theory of direct perception (e.g. Gibson 1979). As we will see below, 
the contradictions between the constructive and the direct views of perception 
seem to be radical. Their discussion and the attempts to solve them (e.g. Neisser 
1976/1984) are not the subject of this chapter – on the issue see for instance Fodor–
Pylyshyn (1981), Gibson (1991a) and Eysenck–Keane (1990/1997).
THE THEORy Of COnSTRUCTIVE (InTEllIgEnT OR CREATIVE) PERCEPTIOn
According to the theory of constructive perception the first step of perception is when 
the organs of sense receive the stimuli of the surrounding world. Sensation is the 
activity of physical systems (neural receptors) as a consequence of the physical and 
chemical stimuli arriving from the outside world, respectively from inside the body. 
The sensation of the stimuli, or in other words, the sensory processes are followed 
by perception, in fact active, interpretative perception
3
, during which “environ-
mental information turns into experiences of objects, events, sounds, flavours and 
others, with the help of the organs of sense” (Roth 1986: 81.). Perception is consi-
dered to have a constructive nature in modern psychology, which means that the 
actual perception of the world surrounding the observer is very complex, and in fact 
“objective” only from a psychological perspective: the process of perception does 
not “map” or “reflect” the world at all in the direct sense of the word; the result of 
perception rather contains the information and its relations very efficiently – in the 
form of the mentioned representations. It is due to this that we can walk along the 
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stairs without actually “having them” in our minds, as our conscious perception 
is not effectively analysing the changes of the surface, but we are following with 
atten-tion the face of our interlocutor, for instance. The mental representation of 
the world is not given to us from the day of our birth, but it is rather shaped and 
enriched by experience. Walking on the stairs with alternating feet for instance is 
learned for a long time with great attention in childhood. The personal and collective 
experiences of the perceiver, similarly his/her emotional conditions, personality etc. 
are all organic part of active and constructive perception processes. Thus, percep-
tion is not objective in the sense that the perceiver often does not perceive at all 
what is there or “really” going on in the outside world, but rather “constructs” his/
her own perception (i.e. what he/she is seeing, hearing, touching, tasting) based on 
physical stimuli, by means of his/her own psychological processes. When someone 
returns to his/her important childhood environment or faces an earlier experience, 
disappointment is not rare: a huge “mountain” seen earlier, perhaps as a small child, 
and represented as such in memories, can in fact be just a small hill for the adult…
Above a shop I saw a sign
saying “GIANT” and “Jeweller”,
in golden letters… I watched again:
G-I-A-N-T ?… Yes, indeed!… Good Lord!… I got excited,
This means that a Giant is living there,
announcing his trade!
[…] For five days I waited; for five full days.
[…] And on the sixth day there I was again
on Main Street. Lifted and let fly 
by all the fairy tales. A wing-opening bliss 
was to observe the golden sign
shining from afar!… And then I got there… And
got shocked: “WATCHMAKER
2
 and Jeweller”:
that was what the wondrous sign said.
Who stole my Giant? --
I cried almost loudly and my heart ached…
Then I just stood there and felt ashamed.
(SZABÓ, Lőrinc: “Cricket music”, excerpts from the poem)
The essence of perception, as we have seen, is the interpretation of the raw ma-
terials of higher level perception functioning, i.e. of sensory information, in other 
words a perceptual meaning transmission. The meaning of the stimuli are hence 
not “given”, but rather defined by cognition. Still, perception is also interestingly 
accurate from a psychological perspective, exactly as a result of its consequence 
character: we know about the vehicle coming in our direction from the end of the 
street, that it is approaching, and not growing in size (although its growing image on 
the retina “objectively” informs us about growth). In everyday life artists, building, 
garden or object designers deliberately build on these constructive, psychological, 
creative processes: this is how it can be achieved for instance that a building or 
a garden seem to be greater from an adequate perspective.
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The nature of perception also depends on cultural experiences (about this see 
e.g. Segall et al. 1966/1970; Altman–Chemers 1980; Serpell 1976/1981; Berry 
et al. 1995). In a classical inquiry (Allport–Peigrew 1957, quoted by Holahan 
1982c/1998) for example, a swivelling, trapeziform window was placed in a room 
so that the observers could not see it as a trapeziform rotating window, but a rec-
tangular (i.e. traditional) one, that could dangle back and forth. In Western culture 
people are used to rectangular windows (the meaning of a typical “window” most 
of the time also implies that it is rectangular), therefore it confirmed the experiences 
of their perceptions – knowledge, mental representation –: if they observed a moving 
type of window-like thing, they could more easily perceive it rectangular, even if 
by that assumption the perception of its movement became inaccurate. This also 
shows the active nature of perception: movement – unlike the window – is irrele-
vant in the case of a window as an element of the environment. For that matter, 
in some cultural comparative surveys, the “window perception performance” of 
European and African town children, used to rectangular windows, was compared 
to that of rural African, Zulu children, who had not been familiar with rectangular 
windows, as the doors on the huts of Zulu settlements are circular. The characte-
ristics of the representation is shown by the fact the Zulu do have a word for the 
circle, but not for square or rectangular. As it had been expected, the results showed 
that Zulu children were less likely to be “deceived” by the window illusion than their 
African or European urban counterparts.
THE IDEA Of “DIRECT PERCEPTIOn”, OR THE THEORy Of ECOlOgICAl 
PercePTion
According to the ecological perception model
5
 (Gibson 1979) there is no need for 
superior, interpretative cognitive processes on the side of the perceiver for the 
act of perception: on the one hand the actual world includes all the information 
needed for perception and active behaviour in the environment, and on the other 
hand, there is often not enough time for complicated cognitive evaluation processes 
when important decisions must be quickly made (e.g. “attack or run away”). Meaning – 
present in the environment – is directly perceived from the environment. In animal 
organisms (including humans) so-called effective perceptual systems developed 
during evolution, more precisely, during natural selection. Therefore, organisms are 
biologically “wired” to be able to pull out “readily available” information in the best 
possible way from the evolutionarily relevant three-dimensional world. This theory 
also provides a good explanation for the previous “vehicle approaching” example: 
the background (buildings, pavement surface etc.) and the moving target object 
itself (changing texture, velocity etc.) provide enough residing information to tea-
ch the perceiver that the approaching vehicle is not growing, but coming closer. The 
representatives of the ecological theory also find the role of learning important in 
environmental perception (Gibson–Gibson 1955/1975), yet, in contrast to the construc- 
tivist approach, they consider that it is not the knowledge about the environment 
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in the head of the perceiver that is growing to become richer and more accurate, but 
perceptual systems become increasingly capable to separate relevant and irrelevant 
environmental stimuli. As I have already mentioned it earlier, it is not that important 
what the head contains (i.e. representation), but more “what the head is contained 
in” (Mace 1977).
Ecological psychologists underline the importance of the active movement of the 
individual in environmental perception. During active movement, we perceive the 
permanent physical characteristics of the objects in the environment, the so-called 
constant, invariable functional characteristics, based on which the perceiver is able 
to judge the usefulness of the objects in the environment: e.g. one can sit, walk, lie 
down, etc. on a uniformly horizontal surface that is adequately large for the human 
body: the surface is “fit for si ng, walking, lying”. These affordances of the objects 
inform the perceiver about their useful functions. Holahan’s (1982c/1998) affor-
dance example: a non-fenestrated object with a solid surface and with an inner 
space that is larger than a human body can serve well against wind, snow or rain.
The ProceSS of enVironmenTal PercePTion
The perception of the environment and of the physical objects is therefore funda-
mentally important in everyday life. Perhaps that is why we are so inclined to see 
this extremely complicated process as self-evident. The processes of environmental 
perception are often unconscious, and this tendency gets stronger the better we 
know, or are used to the environment or the object. Thus, one of the important 
empirical methods of the examination of environmental perception is when resear-
chers observe and describe the behaviour of the people, their primary perception 
processes and the resulting meanings of new objects or the physical environment 
unknown to them. Let us take an example: the lady of the house receives a new 
kitchen appliance with many functions as a Christmas present from her mother-
in-law. At first she only observes it, touches it, trying to acquire information about 
the machine in as many perception modalities, as possible, and as a consequence 
she may find it “hard to assemble” or “difficult to clean up”, in other words “useless”. 
The result of the perception for her in this case is a very complex meaning, that the 
gadget is “too complicated”, or “what I gain by the machine quickly cuing vegetable 
into pieces, I lose with the disassembling of its parts, their cleanup, picking out 
jammed pieces etc. I should better stick to the knife. By the way, it is typical for 
my mother-in-law to come up with a useless object.” Let us suppose that she tells the 
story to her tech-minded husband, who examines the machine thoroughly: “After all 
you got it from Mom, so it should be good for something”. During his perception, 
the husband might also reach to the conclusion (meaning) that the assembling and 
disassembling of the machine is a way too complicated technical task. Then the 
harmless parts of the gadget could end up in the sandpit of the child, for whom 
they could bear the meaning of “I got a nice little toy from Grandma again”. The 
example shows that the objects and their meanings resulting from the perception 
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of their physical environment are not always identical, they can depend on the 
situation, the perceiver (his/her competence, expectations, age etc.), on where the 
object came from etc. Therefore, when explaining the meaning of objects and the 
physical environment, in the following parts of the present chapter we will rely on 
the approach of the “constructive perception” theory.
The general psychological examinations of perception – just like the above example – 
are primarily connected to the perception of objects. There has been less research 
– although that is what environment psychologists would be particularly interested 
in –, on how people perceive complex environments that are composed of many 
objects (Holahan 1982c/1998), like a room, for example, or a building, an entire 
city, or a natural landscape. However, studies about object perception, especially 
the ones that point out the dependence of object perception from the context, 
are a very useful starting point, or even an appropriate framework to understand 
complex, molar environment perception. In an interesting, general psychological 
experiment Biederman (1972/1989) proved for instance, that the perception of 
objects is extremely influenced by the whole environmental context. The parti-
cipants were asked to take a quick glance at slides presenting different environ-
ments (e.g. street, kitchen). Every picture was projected in two versions: once in 
a naturally coherent, clear, meaningful format, then cut into pieces, and mixed. The 
pictures presented to the participants – both the meaningful and the mixed versions 
– contained the same target objects to be observed, always left in their original 
positions (e.g. a fire plug on the street photo, or a pot on the kitchen photo). Parti-
cipants were asked to identify the target objects on the photographs. According to 
the results of the survey, the participants could recognise the objects much more 
accurately on the meaningful pictures than on the mixed ones. Thus, a meaningful 
context helps in the perceptual identification of things. As in the real world objects 
are almost all the time perceived in a meaningful environment context – this result 
can be especially important when trying to understand the perception of objects in 
a real environment (Holahan 1982c/1998).
What is more, according to the approach of environmental psychology, objects 
cannot even be adequately perceived from just one perspective. In the case of the 
environment this must be even more underlined: in order to relatively fully perceive 
a room or a street, it must be observed from several viewpoints and many modali-
ties – in other words, noises, smells, movement experiences can also be important. 
Environmental psychology-oriented perception theories also emphasise, that the 
perception of the physical environment and its objects infer target orientedness, 
as the complexity of the objects/environments, or their size for that matter, make 
it impossible for the perceiver to perceive them passively (Holahan 1982c/1998; 
Benedikt–Burnham 1985). In the environmental psychology specialist literature 
an art exhibition of the New York Jewish Museum is frequently evoked: the artist 
created an extremely “unusual” environment using eight large mirrors. A stroboscope 
lamp and a loudspeaker were attached to each mirror, thus creating a multitude of 
complex and unusual series of light and sound effects. This exhibition inspired 
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several psychological inquiries (see Holahan 1982c/1998), in which the behaviour of 
people was observed under lab control, in unusual, more or less complex, artificial 
environments, very similar to the above one. In our interpretation, the process was 
examined during which the psychological meaning of a strange space was defined. 
In one of these inquiries for instance, participants stayed alone in the unusual 
environment for six minutes. They could have left the space before the time passed, 
yet the majority remained there for the entire six minutes. According to the ob-
servations, people mapped the new environment following two, radically different 
strategies: those belonging to the structural type handled space independently of 
themselves, e.g. by seing up hypotheses about how the environment worked, 
and formulated them, measured the length of sound effects and the time passing 
between them, tried to find connections between the sounds and the flashes of 
light etc. Participants belonging to the other experience type obtained information 
about the space regarding themselves, their own bodies, movements as part of 
the environment, like e.g. they lied down on the floor, stood on one leg, closed 
their eyes in order to perceive the environment in different ways. We may assume 
that the two different ways of cognizance resulted in two types of mental repre-
sentation, but the role of both physical environmental meanings was to assist the 
perceiving person in his/her orientation in a world gradually becoming more and 
more meaningful.
THE MEAnIngS Of THE PHySICAl EnVIROnMEnT: 
SPace/Place and objecT/Thing
The highly significant, meaning defining dimensions of the physical environment 
are real spatial directions and their psychological mappings. During the course of 
evolution the environment and the bilaterally symmetrical human body are psy-
chologically divided according to the important spatial directions – up and down, 
ahead and behind, right and left side. However, these directions do not only help in 
actual orientation; they have also got a more abstract psychological-symbolic me-
aning for orientation in a meaningful world: they create and express actual and psy-
chological relations: for example the words right/left also express value judgments 
in many languages (making one side the “right” one as opposed to the other), rules 
of conduct specify for women to walk on a particular side of men etc. Similar sym-
bolic meanings are attached to the directions up and down (cf. “superior” – “lower 
level”) and ahead-behind (forward, backward) and their linguistic representations. 
Taking the psychological characteristics of the distinguished spatial directions into 
account we can differentiate objective, ego and immanent spaces (Beck 1967/1970). 
Objective space is the actual space that can be physically-mathematically described, 
having characteristics like distance, shape, volume. As its name shows, the ego 
space is defined by the self, when it separates objective space with psychological 
operations; it is a psychological-physical world that serves as the actual scene of 
the accommodation behaviour of the individual; in fact the research of objective/
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environmental perception reveals this space. The immanent space is the internal, 
subjective space, the unconscious world of representations (which, however can be 
made conscious), meaning personal spatial orientation, mapping dimensions, but 
can also appear in dreams or as imaginary object and space manifestations. Mani-
festing behaviour in the above sense means a complex accommodation to a comp-
licated world that is mapped along both physical and psychological characteristics.
It follows from the above that one of the most important, general objectives of 
environmental psychology is to describe behaviour in a way that is specific for the 
place where it occurs (Russell–Ward 1982; Genereux et al. 1983). This means that 
“people always situate their actions in a specifiable place and the nature of the 
place, so specified, is an important ingredient in the understanding of human 
actions and experience” (Canter 1977: 8.). The notion of “place” had already been 
used in a specific way
6
 before the development of environmental psychology [by 
architects and geographers, insofar as they had realised and used in their work the 
principle that generally speaking there are no environments, only “homes”, “hospitals”, 
“towns” etc. – in other word, people map the “world”, i.e. space in countless personal 
experiences, which also carry physical features: these are the places.
“Place refers not only to geographical location but also to the essential character 
of the site which makes it different from other locations. Place, in this sense, is the 
way in which dimensions of landscape come together in location to produce a distinct 
environment and particular sense of locality.” (Seamon 1979: 130.).
Thus the meaning of place also includes its physical features and the emotions, 
experiences connected to them, i.e. the affective component (cf. Russell–Pratt 1980). 
Environmental psychological place theory (Canter 1977) adds to this the psycho-
logical process of interpretation, the cognitive meaning component, the essence of 
which is exactly the meaning attribution to the place. Similarly to the space/place 
distinction the object/thing distinction can also be introduced: in this sense objects 
are physical reality, while things are psychologically defined, meaningful entities 
(Dúll 2003).
The meanings of environment and objects can be examined from several viewpoints 
(Dúll–Urbán 1997): we can speak about the (1) denotative-cognitive, (2) connotative, 
(3) symbolic-aesthetic and (4) behavioural meanings of places. The essence of places 
and objects are exactly that – as it has been mentioned above – these dimensions are 
strongly connected, due to the complexity of the environment/object. The different 
environmental psychological meaning levels have been discussed earlier (Dúll–Urbán 
1997), in this chapter we rather underline their interconnectedness, their patterns.
The denotative-cognitive meaning of the place/object
7
 denotes in fact what the 
environment/object is according to its lexical meaning (a chair or a living room) 
and to what degree it can be recognized, how one can find one’s bearings in/on it, 
how legible it is. Lang (1987; 1992) elaborated a detailed “environmental semiology” 
based on the well-known linguistic system of Charles Morris. According to that, the 
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evolution of environmental symbols (places and things, according to our present inter-
pretation) is the result of cognitive processes, such as comprehension, categorisation, 
linguistic formulation. During these acts of interpretation an environment/ob-
ject gains additional meaning beyond its proper use, which has got three levels: 
(1) syntactic, which means the contextual relationships of the environmental ele-
ments: for instance in homes that belong to the Western cultures, living rooms, 
as public spaces are located in the front, while bedrooms in the back of the house 
(cf. Dúll 1995; Money 2007). (2) The semantic meaning refers to the rules and 
norms related to the environmental elements: what kind of objects we place in our 
living rooms, how these are organised, and it also defines the rules guests must 
follow on these premises. For instance, if chairs are placed facing each other, then 
this sociopetal arrangement favouring social interaction will most likely encourage 
conversation, while if all chairs face the television, than people will very likely watch 
the screen, rather than talk to each other. (3) The pragmatic meaning links the 
environment/object to the user: in our example the arrangement of the furniture 
in the living room as a tool meant to create an impression will tell the visitor a lot 
about the owner of the flat. The essence of the connotative meaning is that feelings, 
personal, individual associations (see e.g. Crozier 1994/2001) could be connected 
to all meanings discussed so far – we judge along emotional dimensions all the 
spaces/objects that we encounter: beautiful–ugly, dangerous–safe etc. This obviously 
can also help us in direct survival, and the affective evaluation can be carried out 
even without the comprehension of the cognitive content: we do not have to know 
about a narrow, dark, foul place what it exactly is – the adaptive manifestation 
will urge us to avoid it, because “it may be dangerous”. The situation is further 
complicated by the fact that – exactly functionally entwined with psychological 
interpretation processes, in a transactional relationship with them (see Dúll 2002c) 
– almost all the elements and characteristics of the built environment carries/may 
carry some meaning (Lang 1987): the shape, structure, size, material, colour, smell, 
style, designation of the place/thing – and we could go on. It can be seen therefore 
that (a) these meaning forms, in an organic connection, give the meaning of the 
place (e.g. a living room) or of the thing together, and (b) thus meanings consciously 
end/or unconsciously may influence the knowledge and the feelings of the people 
about places and things, just as their behaviour in connection with them.
We must not forget however, that environmental stimulation itself also plays an 
important role in environmental meaning, exactly due to its transactional nature.  
According to Berlyne (1960; 1971/1997) environmental stimulation can be described 
by so-called collative variables, such as the novelty, complexity, unexpectedness 
and incongruity of the stimulation. Meaning thus is emerging when the perceiver 
compares the given, current stimulus with other stimuli, alongside these variables, 
and according to general experience he/she perceives the environmental stimuli as 
pleasant, acceptable, meaningful mostly in the mid-range area. Using the example 
of a town: the visitor will judge the given place as cognizable (cognitive component) 
and thus beautiful, lovable (emotional component), he or she will be more likely to 
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visit it frequently (behavioural factor), if the town offers him/her interesting personal 
experiences, because it is original, complex, surprising, containing unexpected scenes 
when one turns around the corner, for instance, but the experience for the visitor 
is neither too little (to make him/her bored), nor too much (to make him/her over-
whelmed with stimuli, become tired or even aggressive), but exactly enough, i.e. 
optimal. It is worthwhile to remember the “object” aspects, as well, like in the earli-
er example with the lady of the house and the kitchen gadget: if the meaning of an 
object is “exaggerated” or “too limited” in any respect, that can produce the limited 
or even the total lack of use of that unenjoyed thing (perhaps even its waste and 
destruction). In such processes the psychological characteristics of the person par-
taking in the object/environment-person interaction (his/her temperament, current 
emotional state, experiences etc.) are certainly also important – however, the detailed 
discussion of these go beyond the scope of this chapter (for more on that see Little 
1987; Dúll–Urbán 1997). In the present outline we emphasise that the develop-
ment of the meaning of the physical environment, environment evaluation are 
interactive in nature: in it the person with his/her own psychological traits and the 
object/space with its characteristics play a simultaneous and equal role. Thus, what 
environmental psychology researches consistently prove, becomes possible: the 
psychological meanings of places/things create a much greater effect than their 
objective characteristics, and this effect can even be a very long-term one, in fact it 
can still hold true even if the given environment or its objective elements physically 
change to a significant degree, or even disappear from our lives.
A female acquaintance kept a small, empty medicine ampoule with an almost comp-
letely faded label on her book-shelf for years, at a visible place. When I asked her 
why she kept that small object at such a visible place, she told me, that about three 
decades before she had fallen madly in love with a boy, who had barely noticed her. 
Once, in the school-yard, the boy accidentally hit her with a snow-ball. She happily 
collected the snow from her coat and put that in a small medicine ampoule that 
she happened to have in her pocket. The small bottle from then on served magical 
purposes: she often kept it in the palm of her hand, trying to influence the boy by 
suggestion to observe her. But the “object-magic” was unsuccessful. Snow-broth 
has long disappeared from the little bottle – yet the bottle reminds her of many 
things: when an idea or an undertaking seems hopeless, by quickly casting a glance 
on the bottle, it is easier to give up the attempts.
The emotional conditions of the person in the example, her experiences, and the 
characteristics, affordances of the object have been and still are simultaneously 
producing a changing psychological meaning: an object originally created for a certain 
use can gain many symbolic meanings during the object-person transaction. In 
a similar way it is possible that a suitably designed object/environment becomes 
non-functional in time – almost all the towns have parks or public spaces that are 
no longer functioning because people do not use them, or conversely, and the list 
could be continued (cf. Dúll 2003).
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objecTS aS enVironmenTal TraceS
We have already seen above how important contexts were in shaping the meanings 
of things/places. Yet the process of conferring meanings does not only help present 
and future orientation in the world, but also functions “backwards”, namely that 
from environmental stages – exactly based on our objective/environmental repre-
sentations, knowledge of meanings – we are able to infer conclusions about what 
had happened in the past at the given place with the given things (and persons, of 
course). Environmental/objective traces (Zeisel 1993) are “expressive”, they provide 
us with sharp environmental communication
8
 (Ruesch–Kees 1964/1970) about 
the events: with their help we can draw conclusions about the facts/ways of using 
places/things or even the lack or unusual ways of their use etc., which of course, 
further enrich their mental meaning. Such physical traces are e.g. the things “left 
behind” – garbage is especially interesting among these
9
:  exciting analyses of environ-
mental psychology were made about what sort of environments are more likely 
to produce garbage (Meeker 1997). But a kitchen is also worth to be examined 
from the perspective of what is left there, where exactly (and for how long!) after 
a feast… The opposite of things left behind is their lack of use, something that 
had already been mentioned in connection with deserted resting places in towns, 
or uselessly complicated household appliances. Further environmental traces are 
bridges-connections, where spatial/physical elements are vertically or horizontally 
united by users; and their opposite, isolation-separation, where a unified space is 
divided onto several parts. A good example for the former could be a plank leant to 
a container to permit a loaded wheel-barrow to be pushed up to the opening of the 
container, or the continuous deterioration at the same spot of sports ground fences 
in order to make a direct “entrance”. Otherwise, if deterioration is always done at 
the same spot, that could also be expressive from an environmental psychology 
perspective: it could mean that the original entrance had been badly placed from 
the perspective of the practical common sense of human behaviour (e.g. a long way 
has to be made from every direction to enter), but also that the dilapidators consi-
der the place their own territory, do not tolerate repair, i.e. intervention etc. This 
example is a further evidence for the fact that without context analysis the meaning 
of environmental/objective traces can never be entirely comprehended, their meaning 
is not absolute, there is no dictionary-like list of solutions to solve them. Common-
place examples of isolation-separation are fences and other elements of boundary, 
but the same function can be fulfilled by a “No trespassing” or a “Private property”sign, 
the differences in level of the surfaces, or a plant on the two sides of a desk. A next 
environmental trace is wear and tear - erosion, which provides good information 
about intense or even proper use: in a museum, for example, “the best” possible 
arrangement of the exhibited objects was examined with environmental psycho-
logy trace analysis (Thomson 1986): from the wear and tear of the carpets it could 
be established which were the most visited objects in the museum. Environmental 
trace analysis also revealed the phenomenon called “keep right” or “exit gradient” 
(Melton 1933, quoted by Thomson 1986), which is worth to be taken into account 
when designing exhibitions: people are more inclined to walk to the right, open doors 
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on the right more frequently etc. Identification as environmental/objective trace 
leaving means that the user makes the object/space meaningful for him/herself 
and the others by connecting it psychologically to him/herself: puts his/her name 
on it, paints it a certain colour etc. An example for that is graffiti, quite controversial 
also from an environmental psychology perspective; yet for competent experts 
the style, colours of a work of art or a building tell a lot, too, and based on them 
sometimes even the creator can be identified.
By all the discussed transformations the psychological meaning of the places/things 
are also altered in most of the cases, which – as we have mentioned before – influence 
their use even on the long run, and naturally, further change their meaning, and so on.
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noTeS
1.Excerpt from the book of Dúll, Andrea: Helyek, tárgyak, behaviour. L’Harmattan, 2009
2. See also Dúll (2001b)
3. The notions of sensation and perception were distinguished for the first time by the Scoish 
philosopher Thomas Reid (1710–1796), and this separation is also at the basis of modern 
conceptions. For a more detailed description of the physiological and general psychological 
processes of sensation and perception, see e.g. Sekuler–Blake (1994/2000).
4. Word-wit: ÓRÁS = “watchmaker” and ÓRIÁS = “giant” in Hungarian.
5. See also: Szokolszky–Kádár (1999); Szokolszky–Dúll (2006).
6. We do not deal here with the phenomenological antecedents of the notions of place and 
thing, e.g. the works of Husserl, Heidegger and others – see e.g. Bacsó (2003).
7. The issue of cognitive meaning is generally the classical area of analysis of general psycho-
logy and environmental psychology; therefore it has got extensive literature. The subject is 
treated from a general psychological point of view by Baddeley (1997/2001), Eysenck–
Keane (1990/1997), for instance, from the perspective of ecological psychology by Szokolszky 
(1998), and from the perspective of environmental psychology by e.g. Downs–Stea (1973).
8. Due to reasons of extent, the present chapter does not deal with the issues of non-verbal 
communication, related to objects. From an explicitly architectural or environmental psycho-
logical point of view the issue is treated by e.g. Ankerl (1991), Csíkszentmihályi–Rochberg-
Halton (1981).
9. An interesting study was published on the subject by Losonczi (2003).
